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Abstract
Potential violent criminals will often need to go through a sequence of
preparatory steps before they can execute their plans. During this escala-
tion process police have the opportunity to evaluate the threat posed by
such people through what they know, observe and learn from intelligence
reports about their activities. In this paper we customise a three-level
Bayesian hierarchical model to describe this process. This is able to prop-
agate both routine and unexpected evidence in real time. We discuss
how to set up such a model so that it calibrates to domain expert judg-
ments. The model illustrations include a hypothetical example based on
a potential vehicle based terrorist attack.
1 Introduction
How to better support police to prevent terrorist attacks continues to be a
major political concern due to continued violence perpetrated by extremists
[13, 2]. In contrast to the majority of terrorist incidents in the latter half of
the twentieth century which were executed by known organised terrorist groups
with substantial planning and sophistication, more recent attacks have often
involved individuals or small groups targeting civilians in public places using
basic equipment such as vehicles, guns and knives [13, 23]. Consequentially
this entails less sophistication in materials, planning and execution. In terms
of analysing how to understand and prevent terrorism, criminologist focus has
shifted from “individual qualities (who we think terrorists ‘are’) to ... what
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lone-actor terrorists do in the commission of a terrorist attack and how they do
it” [17]. Gill, referencing [19], notes “it is useful to view each terrorist offence
as comprising of a series of stages”.
The case studies of lone-actor terrorists have been analysed extensively both
qualitatively and quantitatively for insight into background and preparatory be-
haviours, vulnerability indicators, radicalisation patterns, and modes of attack
planning [7, 11, 23, 6]. These studies emphasize that the small number and het-
erogeneity of cases make rigorous scientific examination of associative and causal
relationships extremely difficult. As they indicate it is vital, therefore, to utilise
structure from existing domain expertise on the relationships between observ-
able data, preparatory activities, and attack modes in any probabilistic analysis
of the progression of an individual to an attack. Probabilistic models, including
Bayesian graphical models, have been used for modelling “comprehension and
decision making of law enforcement personnel with respect to terrorism-centric
behaviours” [30], in a terrorist cell actor-event network analysis [29], for “rapid
detection of bio-terrorist attacks” [15], for spatio-temporal terrorism analyses
[8, 28], and in a “systems analysis approach to setting priorities among coun-
termeasures” against terrorist threat [26].
It is within this context that we present a new class of Bayesian models to dy-
namically infer the progression of an individual through discrete stages towards
a criminal attack. These models have been developed through close discussions
over several years with a number of different policing agencies. To our knowledge
this approach is novel and complements the existing research.
1.1 Overview of the model
A suspect within a subpopulation of interest to the police, ω ∈ Ω, is believed
to be planning a serious criminal attack against the general public. Typically ω
will need to step through various stages of preparation before perpetrating this
crime. During this progression police will have the opportunity to observe and
evaluate ω’s status through their record, updated throughout an investigation
by sporadic intelligence reports and routine observations of ω’s activities. A
dynamic Bayesian model is uniquely placed to provide decision support for such
policing activities. It provides a framework within which to encode criminologi-
cal theories, domain knowledge available about ω, for example his police record
and personal modus operandi, and also draw in evidence from noisy streaming
data about ω observed by police. All these features are integrated into a single
dynamic probability model. The model we build in this paper tracks the prob-
ability ω lies in certain states or makes a transition from one state into another
at any given time. These probabilities help to guide interventions and resource
allocations.
To be operational such a Bayesian model must be constructed so that current
prior information in a given suspect ω’s record can be quickly updated not only
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in the light of routine surveillance but also unexpected sources. So, for example,
police may well be monitoring the phone log of someone suspected of a serious
crime. But within an investigation direct information sporadically comes to light
about what ω is doing – unexpected sightings, overheard statements of intent,
and so on. It would be unreasonable to assume that this type of information,
often critical to a correct appraisal of ω’s status, could have been forecast and
accommodated into any prior model specification. Any methodology we design
for this domain therefore needs to be open to manual intervention [35]. Police
will then be able to input these unpredicted new sources of information into the
system and so improve the probability assessments of the Bayesian model. A
three level hierarchy facilitates this openness property.
At the deepest level lies a Reduced Dynamic Chain Event Graph (RDCEG).
This is a graphically based model drawn from a particular subclass of finite state
semi-Markov processes customised to model transition processes in a subpop-
ulation of the general public [31]. This deepest level provides a framework for
expressing the probability judgements of police concerning ω’s current threat
status.
The intermediate level of our hierarchy concerns intelligence police might
acquire concerning ω’s enacted intentions. When a suspect is at a particular
stage of a criminal pathway, in order to engage in that step of criminality or
alternatively to progress to the next step, a set of associated tasks needs to be
completed. Intermittent intelligence reports often inform these. Because these
are explicit components of the hierarchical model propagating such information
corresponds to simple conditioning. A vector of tasks whose components form
parts of a signature of various states of criminal intent and capability forms the
variables that lie on the intermediate layer of the hierarchy.
The surface layer of the model then links these tasks to the intensities of
certain activities that can be routinely observed by the police if they have the
necessary resource and permissions. In the absence of direct information about
ω’s engagement in tasks, signals from predesigned filters provide vital informa-
tion about what ω might be doing. For example suppose the task concerns ω’s
intent to travel to a region to learn how to bomb. Then a filter that measures
the intensity of the suspect’s engagement in searching airline websites would
give a noisy signal of his booking a flight. Such information is imperfect: ω
may book a flight directly from an airport or to have chosen not to fly to the
destination. And of course a high intensity in such activity could be entirely
innocent: ω may be booking his wife’s vacation, for example. Such measures are
nevertheless obviously informative. Appropriately chosen filters of these data
streams provide the surface level of our Bayesian hierarchy. The usual Bayesian
apparatus then provides a formal and justifiable framework around which police
can logically and defensibly propagate information about ω.
Formally describing states by collections of tasks within generic Bayesian mod-
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els supporting criminal investigations is, to our knowledge, novel. However it is
interesting that [14] proposed a similar approach albeit less formally expressed
and in a more restricted domain: the discovery of recruiters to radicalisation
to extreme violence from Twitter communications. By performing a number of
thought experiments with domain experts these authors successfully extracted
a collection of tasks that a recruiter would need to engage in to be effective.
Although an innocent non-recruiter, such as an academic or journalist, might
happen to engage in some of the tasks in this collection they would be unlikely
to engage in all of these tasks simultaneously. The authors then related this
vector to various easily extracted meta data signals that could be routinely ex-
tracted from an enormous dataset. This provided an analogue of the types of
filter of a routinely applied observation vector we discuss later here.
In the next section we describe the RDCEG and demonstrate through some
simple examples how it can be used to translate domain experts’ judgements
into a latent probability model at the deepest level of a hierarchy. We also il-
lustrate sets of tasks that ω lying in a particular state or transitioning between
states might entail. Our core methodology is described in Section 3. We pro-
pose a collection of assumptions, elicited from domain experts, about the ways
criminal progressions associate to tasks, and how the intensities synthesise vari-
ous sources of routine measurements of engagement in each of these tasks given
background circumstances. Given these assumptions we are able to propagate
not only routine indirect but also unexpected direct information about ω’s cur-
rent activities to obtain posterior probabilities about ω’s current position.
The resulting propagation algorithms are straightforward to enact. However
the inputs of the model: both the structural prior information and the prior
parameter distributions embellishing them need to be carefully specified if the
methodology is going to be operationalised. In Section 4 we outline how we do
this.
In this setting to explore the methods using known data on given suspects
as illustrations is clearly unethical. However it is still possible to demonstrate
how the system works in various hypothetical situations whose distributions are
informed by publically available data and elicited judgements. Therefore in Sec-
tion 5 we illustrate the way the system is able to update the state probabilities
of an individual under suspicion of a potential attack. We describe the different
task sets we have used and the construction of routine filters and test these
against a two scenarios. In the concluding section we discuss how we are now
extending the methodology to model threatening subpopulations of the general
public where estimation and model selection algorithms can also be built to
better understand the developing processes.
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2 The RDCEG for Criminal escalation
2.1 Introduction
Chain event graphs (CEGs) are now an established tool for modeling discrete
processes where there is significant asymmetry in the underlying development
see e.g. [3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 9]. Dynamic versions of these processes, using analogous
semantics, first appeared in [4]. However formal extensions of these classes to
model open populations have only recently been discovered [34] and developed
[31, 32]. We briefly review and illustrate the main properties of this class as
they apply to the hierarchical model developed here. We refer the reader to the
references above for more details.
The RDCEG we use in this paper is a particular family of semi-Markov process
that can be expressed by a single graph. Each represented state is called a
position. In our domain there is an absorbing state - called the neutral state
that ω enters when presenting no future threat of perpetrating the given crime.
The practical challenge is to find a way to systematically construct the set of
positions so that the embedded Markov assumptions are faithful to expert judge-
ments. In [4] and [31] we describe how this can be done. We take a natural
language description from domain experts and re-express this as a potentially
infinite coloured tree. We then translate this tree into an equivalent coloured
graph C. For the purposes above we will henceforth assume this to have a finite
number of vertices.
A position w is connected by a directed edge into another w′ in the graph
of an RDCEG iff there is a positive probability that the next transition from w
will be into w′. Typically although the transition probabilities are fairly stable,
the time it takes to make a transition is not. Therefore we need to express this
expert judgement as a semi-Markov rather than Markov process. Finally two
positions in an RDCEG are placed in the same stage and assigned the same
colour when the probabilities of their next transition conditional on that per-
son not transitioning next into the neutral state are the same. In this case two
directed edges associated with different positions identified by this equivalence
are also assigned the same colour.
In this paper for simplicity we present only small RDCEGs where this colouring
is not so important. However for models with more than a few vertices the
addition of colours is critical to keep it simple to elicit. The coloured graph C
is one that on the one hand is often found to be transparent and natural to our
users but on the other has a formal Bayesian interpretation. So this elicited
graph provides a vehicle to move seamlessly from an expert elicitation into a
more formal family of stochastic processes.
The RDCEG developed in [32] was designed to be applied to public health
processes where C could often be observed directly. For criminal processes this
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is not usually possible. Therefore for crime modelling an RDCEG process typi-
cally remains latent and any prior to posterior analysis of the suspect’s positions
needs a little more sophistication. The hierarchical structure we define in the
next section provides the framework for this update. We give some simplified
illustrations below of such RDCEGs.
2.2 A Criminal RDCEG and its Tasks
We describe an RDCEG, Figure 1, for a politically motivated murder plot illus-
trating the relationship between its states and tasks: the lowest and intermediate
levels in our hierarchical model.
Example 2.1. Electronic posts directly observed by the police suggest woman
S is plotting to kill a certain political figure by shooting them. At any time
S could lie in a number of positions. In positions w3 and w4 she is trained to
shoot (T ) in w1 and w2 not (T
c) and will own a gun (G) - position w2 and
w4 or not (G
c) when in positions w1 and w3. Each edge and each vertex in
the RDCEG C1below can be associated to different collections of tasks. For
example the vertex w5 = O is associated with the task “attempt murder”; the
edges w1 → w2 and w3 → w4 are associated with the task “acquire gun”. If
she cannot shoot she could next choose to learn how next: in a state where she
currently owns a gun (T c, G) or not (T c,Gc). Alternatively if she currently has
no gun then she could next try to acquire one, either when trained to shoot or
not. At any point in this process she may enter the neutral state w0 = N : for
example the target may die through other natural or unnatural circumstances,
S may change her intention, or she may be arrested the police having gained
enough evidence to charge her. The relevant RDCEG C1 and a table describing
the positions, edges, and tasks are given in Figure 1 and Table 1.
Here from the graph of the RDCEG C1 we can see police have assumed that if
she kills her target she will cease being a threat. Note that only once she has
a gun and can shoot - state (T,G) - can she attempt the murder O by locating
and then approaching the target.
Tc,Gc
Tc,G T,Gc
T,G
O
Figure 1: The RDCEG C1 for a murder plot
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States Description / State Tasks Edges Edge Tasks
w0 = N plot ends
w1 = T
c, Gc can’t shoot, no gun w1 → w2 acquire gun
w1 → w3 train to shoot
w2 = T
c, G can’t shoot, has gun w2 → w4 train to shoot
w2 → w1 lose gun
w3 = T,G
c trained to shoot, no gun w3 → w4 acquire gun
w4 = T,G trained to shoot, has gun w4 → w5 locate and approach target
w4 → w3 lose gun
w5 = O attempt murder w5 → w4 fail and escape
Table 1: States, edges and tasks for example 2.1
The RDCEG C1 does not have any positions such that there exists two or more
edges between them and thus it is simply a subgraph of the state transition graph
of a semi-Markov process defining the dynamic where the absorbing state N and
all edges into it are removed. All states in the process other than w0 appear as
vertices. In this example all tasks can be associated to one or more edges. Note
that an edge may well be associated with more than one task: here w4 → w5
is associated with locating and approaching the target. The structure of the
transition matrix, M1 with states w0, w1, . . . , w5 of a semi-Markov process with
a configuration of zeros given below. The starred entries represent probabilities
that need to be added to complete the matrix.
w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5

w0 1 0 0 0 0 0
w1 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0
w2 ∗ ∗ 0 0 ∗ 0
w3 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0
w4 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗
w5 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0
Note this RDCEG has translated the verbal police description above into a
semi-Markov process. It can be elaborated into a full semi-Markov model by
eliciting or estimating the probabilities in M1 and the holding times. In the
above, because of the sum to one condition, we have eight functionally indepen-
dent transition probabilities. To complete the specification of this stochastic
process it is necessary to define the holding time distributions associated with
the active states i.e. how long we believe the suspect will stay in their current
state before transitioning into another. These probabilities and the parameters
of the holding time distributions may well themselves be uncertain. However of
course within a Bayesian analysis their distributions can be elicited or estimated
in standard ways [25].
The implicit Markov hypotheses of a given RDCEG are of course typically
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substantive. One critical issue is that its positions/states define the only as-
pects of the history of the suspect that are asserted relevant to predicting her
or his future acts. The art of the modeler is to elicit positions in such a way
that these Markov assumptions are faithful to the expert judgements being ex-
pressed. However because the methodology is fully Bayesian, experts can be
interrogated as to the integrity of these assumptions just as they can be for
other graphical models [33]. In this way we can iterate towards a model which
is requisite [27]. The process of query, critique, elaboration and adjustment
is precisely why this bespoke graphical representation is such a powerful tool.
In particular a faithful structural model of the domain information can be dis-
covered [33] before numerical probabilities are elicited or estimated: see e.g.
[36, 9].
2.3 From Tasks to Routinely Observed Behaviour
Sometimes solid police intelligence, for example from an informant, will confirm
that ω is engaged in a particular task. But at other times only echoes of a
task will be seen by police. Suppose ω is suspected of being at a stage where
they need to accomplish the task of selecting a target location for a bombing
or vehicle attack. They might be observed travelling to what the police assess
might be a potential target to check timings, the density of people at the venue
and its defences activities. This visitation by ω might have been recorded on
CCTVs. In addition or instead, ω might inspect Google maps of the attack area
and the route to it or contact like-minded collaborators by phone or electronic
media for advice. So indirect evidence ω engages in such a task can come from
a variety of media and platforms.
Even such incomplete and disguised signals can be usefully filtered from com-
plex incoming data about the suspect, albeit with considerable associated uncer-
tainty. The further a suspect currently is from the main focus of an investigation
the more indirect information will be. However even then the composition of a
collection of weak signals the police are allowed to see may still provide enough
information to significantly revise the evaluation of the threat posed by a par-
ticular individual.
The hierarchical structure we describe below enables us to draw together all
these different types of evidence. If direct information about the tasks a suspect
is engaging in is available then, because such tasks are explicitly represented
within our model, we can simply condition on this information and so refine
our judgements. The Bayesian hierarchical model simply discards the weaker
indirect information to focus on what is known. Otherwise the model uses filters
of the indirect signals police can see to infer what tasks ω might be engaging in
to help inform police of ω’s position.
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3 The structure of the hierarchical task model
3.1 Introduction
Henceforth assume that the RDCEG C correctly specifies the underlying process
concerning ω. To build the propagation algorithms we first define our notation.
Let Wt be the random variable taking as possible values the states
{w0, w1, w2, . . . , wm} of ω ∈ Ω - the subpopulation of interest - at time t > 0
where {w1, w2, . . . , wm} are the vertices/positions/active states of C and w0 the
inactive/neutral state. At any time t, ω might enact one or more of R tasks
associated to one or more of the positions {w1, w2, . . . , wm} or alternatively to
a transition from one position w− into another w+. So let
{θt = (θt1, θt2, . . . , θtR) : t ≤ T}
denote the task vector θt: a vector of binary random variables where θti = 1,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R}, indicates that ω is enacting task i at time t.
Let χI denote an indicator on a subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , R}. Then the tasks a
suspect ω ∈ Ω engages in at a given time t can be represented by events of the
form {θt = χI : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}.
Direct positive evidence that ω lies at position wi is provided by tasks whose
indices lie in I = I(wi) and when ω is transitioning along the edge e(w−, wi)
by tasks whose indices lie in I = I(w−, wi), where I(wi) and I(w−, wi) are
both subsets of index set {1, 2, . . . , R} of tasks. Note that the m + 1 sets
{I(wi), I(w−, wi) : wi, w−, wi ∈ {w1, w2, . . . , wm}} , i = 0 . . .m typically do not
form a partition of {1, 2, . . . , R}: tasks can be simultaneously suggestive that ω
lies in one of a number of different active positions.
Occasionally police may also acquire negative evidence from learning that a sus-
pect - thought to have just before lain in position wi or be transitioning along
e(w−, w+) - ceases to perform any of the associated tasks. From observing the
absence of these tasks they might then infer that ω might have transitioned
either to w0 or a different active state adjacent to wi in C. Similar negative
inferences might also be made indirectly from learning that ω stops engaging in
all tasks associated with an edge emanating from wi.
With these issues in mind therefore, let I∗(wi) , I∗−(wi) ∪ I∗+(wi) where
I∗+(wi) , I(wi) ∪
⋃
e(w−,wi)∈E(C)
I(w−, wi). (1)
I∗−(wi) ,
⋃
e(w−,wi)∈E(C)
I(w−) ∪
⋃
e(wi,w+)∈E(C)
I(wi, w+) (2)
Thus I∗+(wi) is the set of tasks which can positively discriminate wi from w0
when the corresponding components take the value 1. The set of tasks in I∗−(wi)
9
can negatively discriminate: when taking the value 0 they indicate that ω has
ceased to engage in tasks associated with preceding positions and is not en-
gaging in any tasks suggestive of leaving wi. The set I
∗(wi) is then the set of
indices of all tasks in any way relevant to wi.
For each of the component tasks θtk we associate a vector of observations of
a set of related actions: Ytk ∈ Rdk ,
⋃
k=1,R Ytk = Yt ∈ Rd, dk ≤ d, k = 1 . . . R
where Yt is all the routinely observable data on ω and d is the dimension of this
data. Denote the values taken by Yt as yt. It will usually be necessary to work
with a filter of these data streams. So let Ztk = τk(Ytk) denote real functions
of these processes and set Zt = (Zt1 . . . ZtR).
One issue in modeling serious crime is that data concerning a suspect is hidden,
lost, disguised or even be the result of the use of a decoy. This means that the
data streams are often intentionally corrupted. However, in contrast to models
that describe the data streams directly, our state space model can accommodate
such disruptions: see [35]. Guided by police expert judgement, we can explic-
itly model the processes designed to disguise or deceive through an appropriate
choice of sample distribution of observations given each task. Although details
of this type of specification are beyond the scope of this paper we note that an
albeit simpler treatment of analogous informed missingness has already been
successfully applied in a public health study [5].
3.2 The hierarchical model
3.2.1 The conditional independence structure defining the hierarchy
Because by definition and through the process defined above we would like per-
fect task information to override all such indirect information we will henceforth
assume task sufficiency. This states that for all time t
Wt q Yt|θt,Ft (3)
where Ft represents the filtration of the past data until but not including time
t. This clearly implies that for all time t.
Wt qZt|θt,Ft (4)
Ideally we would prefer the filter {Zt}t≥0 we use to be sufficient for {θt}t≥0 too
i.e. that for all time t
θt q Yt|Zt,Ft (5)
Then there would be no loss in discarding information in Yt not expressed in
Zt. In what we henceforth present, since we develop recurrences only concern-
ing {Zt}t≥0 and not {Yt}t≥0 we implicitly assume condition 5.
Although condition 5 is a heroic one, in our examples a well-chosen one dimen-
sional time series of intensities Ztk, performs well even when these are chosen
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to be linear in the records of the component signals Ytk. One advantage of this
simplicity is that the role of the filter can be explained and if necessary adapted
by the user, perhaps even customising this filter to their own personal modus
operandi and judgements.
Again for simplicity we henceforth assume that any filter {Zt}t≥0 will be a
Markov task filter i.e. that for all t > 0
{Zt′}t′≥t q |θt,Ft (6)
This assumption is a familiar one made for dynamic models; see e.g. [35].
It assumes that once the task is known, no further past information about
past {Zt}t≥0 will add anything further useful for predicting the future. This
assumption enables us, for particular choices of sample distributions, to use all
the established recurrences for dynamic state space models - in particular those
from dynamic switching models so excellently summarised in [16]. Here our
RDCEG probability model specifies such a switching mechanism.
3.2.2 Defining tasks to be fit for purpose
Our interpretation of I∗(w) requires that if suspect ω is known to be either
neutral or in any active state wi then the only components in θt that helpfully
discriminates between these two possibilities must lie in θI∗(wi),t. The assump-
tion Task set integrity demands I∗(wi) is defined so that for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Wt q θt|Wt ∈ {w0, wi},θI∗(wi),t (7)
This is equivalent to requiring that
pt (wi|θt,Ft)
pt (w0|θt,Ft) =
pt
(
wi|θI∗(wi)t,θÎ∗(wi)t,Ft
)
pt
(
w0|θI∗(wi)t,θÎ∗(wi)t,Ft
)
is a function only of θI∗(wi)t where Î
∗(w) denotes the set of indices not in
I∗(w). Task set integrity is always satisfied by setting I∗(w) = {1, 2, . . . , R} , i =
1, 2, . . . ,m but of course for transparency and computational efficiency ideally
I∗(w) is chosen to be a small subset of {1, 2, . . . , R}. Providing the divisor is
not zero, task set integrity holds whenever
λ̂i
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
, log pt
(
θÎ∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t, wi,Ft
)
−log pt
(
θÎ∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t, w0,Ft
)
is a function of θt only through θI∗(wi)t. So by writing the prior and posterior
log -odds as
ρit , log pt (wi|Ft)− log pt (w0|Ft) ,
ρ∗it , log pt (wi|θt,Ft)− log pt (w0|θt,Ft)
11
and the loglikelihood ratio of task vector λi
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
,
λi
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
, log pt
(
θI∗(wi)t|wi,Ft
)− log pt (θI∗(wi)t|w0,Ft)
then a little rearrangement gives us an adaptation of the usual Bayesian linear
updating equation linking posterior and prior odds viz:
ρ∗it = ρit + λi
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
+ λ̂i
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
(8)
Note that equation (7) holds in particular whenever it is a simple task vector ;
i.e. has the property that for any time t > 0, ω ∈ Ω and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
pt
(
θÎ∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t, wi,Ft
)
= ptj(θÎ∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t, w0,Ft) (9)
Property 9 holds whenever the other tasks are useless for discriminating any
threat position wi from w0: the probability ω engages in these tasks does not
depend on these other tasks. In this case the term λ̂i
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
vanishes and
ρ∗it = ρit + λi
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
(10)
For practical reasons we have often found it convenient to decompose λi
(
θI∗(wi),t,j
)
into functions of components in I∗−(wi) and I
∗
+(wi) respectively. When these
are disjoint and conditionally independent given wi - as in practice we find is
often a plausible assumption then
λi
(
θI∗(wi)t
)
= λ−i
(
θI∗−(wi)t
)
+ λ+i
(
θI∗+(wi)t
)
(11)
where
λ−i
(
θI∗−(wi)t
)
, log pt
(
θI∗−(wi)t|wi,Ft
)
− log pt
(
θI∗−(wi)t|w0,Ft
)
,
λ+i
(
θI∗+(wi)t
)
, log pt
(
θI∗+(wi)t|wi,Ft
)
− log pt
(
θI∗+(wi)t|w0,Ft
)
Note here that, by definition, λ−i
(
θI∗−(wi)t
)
, takes its maximum value when
θI∗−(wi)t = 0 and λ+i
(
θI∗+(wi)t
)
takes its maximum value when θI∗+(wi)t = 1,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The Equations 10 are now sufficient to calculate the probability that ω is in
each of the positions w1, w2, . . . , wm given our evidence, using the familiar in-
vertible function from log odds to probability: see [33].
3.2.3 Model Assumptions concerning Routine Observations
For our chosen filtered sequence Zt , (Z1t, Z2t, . . . , ZRt) designed to pick up
the different tasks associated with a criminal process let
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Zk̂t ,
(
Z1t, Z2t, . . . , Z(k−1)t, Z(k+1)t, . . . , ZRt
)
Then a simple but bold type of Naive Bayes assumption is to assume that filter
Zt is pure: i.e. that for any set θAt containing θkt as a component
Zkt qZk̂t|θAt,Ft (12)
Then Bayes Rule and task set integrity implies that within tasks
pt
(
zI∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
=
∏
k∈I∗(wi)
pt (zkt|θkt,Ft)
whilst across tasks
pt (wit|zt,Ft) =
∑
θI∗(wi)t∈ΘI∗(wi)
pt
(
wit|θI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
pt
(
θ
I∗(wi)t
|zI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
(13)
where
p
(
θI∗(wi)t|zI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
=
p
(
zI∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
p
(
θI∗(wi)t|Ft
)
p
(
zI∗(wi)tj |Ftj
)
Let the prior and posterior odds be respectively denoted by
φiAi′t , log pt
(
θ
I∗(wi)t
= χA|Ft
)
− log pt
(
θI∗(wi)t = χ∅|Ft
)
φ∗iAi′t , log pt
(
θ
I∗(wi)t
= χA|yI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
− log pt
(
θ
I∗(wi)t
= χ∅|yI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
γkt , log pt (zkt|θkt = 1,Ft)− log pt (zkt|θkt = 0,Ft)
and let γAt ,
∑
k∈A γkt. Then
log pt
(
zI∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t = χA,Ft
)− log pt (zI∗(wi)t|θI∗(wi)t = χ∅,Ft) = γAt
and from the above
φ∗iA′t = φ
iA
t + γ
A
i′t (14)
For any set A we can therefore calculate
pt
(
θI∗(wi)t = χA|zI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
(15)
where the Law of Total Probability implies that for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m
pt(Wt = wi|zt,Ft) =
∑
θ∈ΘI∗(wi)
pt (wi|θ,Ft) pt
(
θ|zI∗(wi)t,Ft
)
(16)
Here the position probabilities over tasks calculated from Equation (14) are
averaged over the different tasks possibly explaining the data, weighting using
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the posterior probabilities given in Equation (15). Note that it is easy to check
that these indirect observations provide less discriminatory power than when
tasks are observed directly. The assumptions above therefore provide us with
a formally justifiable propagation algorithm for updating the probabilities of a
suspect’s likely criminal status. We next turn to how we might calibrate the
model to the expert judgements we might elicit from criminologists, police and
technicians about the probable relationships between criminal status, what they
might try to accomplish and how this endeavour might be reflected through how
they communicate.
4 The Elicitation Process
4.1 Introduction
Copying the standard protocols for the elicitation of a Bayesian Network: see
e.g. [21], as in e.g. [36] our process begins with the elicitation of structure. We
perform a sequence of three structural elicitations for each of the three levels.
These can proceed almost entirely using natural language descriptions of the
process. Because the representation of the structure of each of the levels is for-
mal and compatible with a probability model the structural elicitation can take
place before the model is quantified. This is extremely helpful because struc-
tural information is typically much easier to elicit faithfully than quantitative
judgments. The RDCEG defining this structure, the list of tasks and how these
might interrelate and then the choice of filter of the routine observations follows:
1. First the decision analyst elicits the positions of the process via the careful
conversion of natural language expressions within the domain experts’
description of the process into the topology of a RDCEG - often somewhat
more nuanced than the ones we discussed above and in the example below.
2. Second the positions and edges of this RDCEG are then associated to
elicited portfolios of tasks.
3. Finally each task is associated with the way domain experts and police
believe ω might behave in order to carry out these tasks, including how
they might choose to disguise these actions and so what signals might be
visible when ω enacts a task.
We now briefly outline each of these steps in turn in a little more detail.
4.2 Choosing an appropriate RDCEG
Firstly, when eliciting a RDCEG we aim to keep the number of positions as
small as possible within the constraint that they are sufficient to distinguish
relevant states. The choice of topology should reflect what is known about the
development of the modelled criminal behaviour. Positions may depend on the
history, environmental and personality profile covariates exhibited by a suspect.
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Relevant population studies of criminal behaviours are often helpful here. We
have found that the coarsest type of model - an illustration of such given in the
next section - of different types of attack and concerning different people - are
surprisingly generic.
Secondly positions need to be well defined enough to pass the Clarity Test
[20, 33]. This is achieved by demanding that the suspect could, if they were
so minded, place themselves in a particular position. Such categories are of-
ten syntheses of standard scales used by social workers and probation workers
across the world. Many examples of these types of categorisations, based on fus-
ing various publicly available categorisations - for example those found in the
training manuals of social workers in detecting people threatening to eventually
perpetrate acts of severe violence - are given in [34].
Thirdly positions must be defined such that for each position there is a col-
lection of tasks associated with it that jointly informs whether the suspect is in
that position or transitioning from that position to another position. A stylised
example of this association was given earlier in this paper and we will illustrate
the process in more detail in the next section with a deeper illustration.
Once the RDCEG has been drawn its embedded assumptions can be queried by
automatically generating logical deductions concerning the implications of the
model. If such deductions appear implausible to relevant domain experts then
positions need to be redefined and graphs redrawn until they are. The ways of
iterating until a model is requisite and the nature of these deductions is beyond
the scope of this paper but are discussed in [9].
The final step in the elicitation of the RDCEG will be the prior conditional prob-
abilities associated with the positions and the hyperparameters of the holding
times. Suitable generic methods for this elicitation are now very well estab-
lished: see e.g. [25, 33] and these need little adaptation to be applied. Note, in
particular, that the methods described for the elicitation of the position prob-
abilities in the RDCEG are essentially identical to those for the CEG as for
example discussed in a chapter of [9].
4.3 Elicitation of portfolios of tasks
4.3.1 Clustering the tasks
The next elicitation process is to take each position in turn and a list of associ-
ated tasks conditional on ω being known to lie in that position. The questions
we might ask would be something like “Now suppose that you happen to learn
that ω lies in position wi. What behaviours/tasks would you expect them to
perform that would be different from what they would typically do were they
neutral?” We try to ensure that either ω’s engagement in such tasks could be
learned through intelligence or alternatively be indicated through certain filters.
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Typically in well designed models we specify tasks so that they are as specific
to only a small proportion of ω’s active states. This makes them as discrimina-
tory as possible. Note that each component of θt must be defined sufficiently
precisely - i.e. pass the clarity test for ω to be able to divulge its value if so
inclined; see [34].
We have found it useful to toggle between specifying positions and specifying
tasks: sometimes aggregating positions if they appear associated with the same
sets of tasks or splitting a position into a set of new ones if a finer definition can
discriminate between one position and another. It is also sometimes helpful to
readjust the definition of tasks once we have elicited possible signals.
Once the task sets are requisite [27, 33] we need to specify the various odds
ratios against the neutral state. We illustrate this in the next section.
4.3.2 Simplifying assumptions that can ease task probability elicita-
tion
Although the log score updating formulae 8, 10 are simple ones, to evaluate the
log odd scores above can demand a great many probabilities, both of each task
given its associated position and of seeing that task performed if ω were neu-
tral, to be elicited or estimated. This can destabilise the system unless various
simplifying assumptions are made.
Conditional on an active position wi we recommend that the first probabil-
ity to be elicited is when ω is engaging in all the tasks in the portfolio of tasks
associated with w. We then use this elicitation to benchmark the probability
that ω is engaging in a subset of these tasks. To calculate the odds of the
portfolio against the neutral suspect, a default assumption that is sometimes
appropriate is simply to assume that people will engage in these probabilities
independently- a naive Bayes Assumption [33] for the neutral suspect. In this
case for any time t > 0, ω ∈ Ω and i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
pt (θt|w0,Ft) =
R∏
k=1
pt (θtk|w0,Ft)
It is easy to check that when a portfolio contains more than one task, and
when such an assumption is valid, it can provide the basis of a very powerful
discriminatory tool. This is because the divisor in the relevant odds reduces
exponentially with the number of tasks whilst in the denominator does not: see
e.g. [34] for an example of this.
Of course in some instances this naive Bayes assumption may not be appropri-
ate. It will then need to be substituted. When population statistics associated
with public engagement in different task activities are available these can be
used to verify this assumption or form the basis of constructively replacing it.
16
4.4 Choosing an appropriate filter of routine data streams
Typically we would like the components of {Zt}t≥0 to measure an intensity of
activity related to a position or edge task. In this sense we would therefore like
to factor out all signals that might be considered typical of ω’s innocent activ-
ities so that we can focus on the incriminating signals. The full data stream
{Yt}t≥0 collected on ω tends to be a highly non-stationary multivariate time
series. However we strive to construct the filter {Zt}t≥0 so that the stochastic
dependence it exhibits is explained solely by ω’s engagement in certain tasks
(see equation 6). This filter is clearly dependent both on population level sig-
nals and what we know about ω’s personality. We therefore usually need expert
judgments to choose {Zt}t≥0 so that it is fit for purpose.
There are some generic features that are worth introducing at this stage. First
in the case of edge tasks we typically observe something different than before as
ω begins to enact a new task in order to make a transition. So some components
of Zt will be defined as first differences of derived series. Secondly indicative
observations may also need to be smoothed from the past - either because what
we see may forewarn a task is about to be enacted, or simply because short
term averages - for example any measure of intensity of communication - will
often be better represented by an average over the recent past rather than by
an instantaneous measure.
To construct our hierarchical model we typically loop around the bullets be-
low:
1. Reflect on what functions of the vector of observable data available to the
police might help indicate that a suspect really does lie in a particular
task rather than other related innocent activities, k = 1, 2, . . . , R. This
choice should be informed by the ease at which such signals can be filtered
but also how easy it might be for a criminal to disguise that signal were
they to learn that the chosen candidate filter was being used.
2. Using expert judgments and any survey data available, reflect on what
the distribution of zkt might be were the suspect actually engaged in the
particular task and if they were not. Thus specify
p(zkt|θkt = 1) and p(zkt|θkt = 0)
3. Check that these two distributions are not close to one another. If not
return to the first step.
Finally in many instances of such police work routine measurements concerning
suspects are typically recorded and reported over fixed periods of time. This
means that the filtered observation sequence is a discrete time filter. For mod-
eling purposes it has been necessary to define the deep stochastic process as
semi-Markov. However the semi-Markov structure with holding times and tran-
sition probabilities specified will retain the Markov structure over the fixed time
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points. This means once appropriate transformations are applied standard up-
dating rules associated with Markov switching models are then valid [16]: see
Appendix B.
5 A Vehicle Attacker Example
5.1 States
We now give a more detailed example of a vehicle attacker that illustrates the
three level hierarchical model of latent states, tasks, and routinely observable
data. We specify the states of the RDCEG to be:
W = {N,A, T, P,M} (17)
where N is Neutral, A is ActiveConvert, T is Training, P is Preparing, and M
is Mobilised. Based on existing information about the suspect we assign prior
probabilities to each state as shown in Figure 2; implicitly the prior probability
for the elided Neutral state is 0.05. Based on knowledge about such attacks
we hypothesize that the suspect may transition from A to T or P, from T to
P, from P to M, and from M back to P. These transitions are indicated by
the directed edges between the vertices on said figure. The weights labelling
the transitions are the probabilities of transitions from the source vertex to the
destination vertex conditional on a transition having occurred (i.e. the entries
labelled mwi,wj in Table 5 in Appendix B). The probability of transition into
the Neutral state from any represented state is implied by the sum of all the
emanating edges’ probabilities summing to one. This is in contrast to [31] where
the transition probabilities are conditional on not moving to the absorbing state.
This prior RDCEG is used in all the examples in this section.
18
ActiveConvert 0.6
Training 0.2
0.4
Preparing 0.1
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.05
0.9990.999
Figure 2: RDCEG for Vehicle Attacker
5.2 Tasks
We hypothesize the tasks relevant for these positions, i.e. the tasks that are
related to which position the suspect is in, are:
θ = {θj}Rj=1
where:
θ1 is Engaging with Radicals θ2 is Engaging in Public Threats
θ3 is Making Personal Threats θ4 is Fewer Public Engagements in Radicalisa-
tion
θ5 is Fewer Contacts with Family and Friends
θ6 is Securing Monetary Resources
θ7 is Learning to Drive Large Vehicle θ8 is Obtaining Vehicle
θ9 is Reconnaissance of Target Locations θ10 is Moving to Target Location
For each position wi, a particular subset of the above tasks are taken to be
indicators that the suspect is there. I∗(wi) is the index set for this subset and
we need to specify the distribution p(θI∗(wi)|wi) for each position. Appendix A
details a methodology for this specification that makes the model discriminatory
and Table 4 shows the resulting probabilities used.
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5.3 Routinely Observable Data
The data used to estimate the probabilities that the suspect is engaging in any
particular task or tasks are varied and various and may change as technologies
and data gathering methods change. In addition as new evidence is gained and
the threat level of a suspect increases the authorities may decide to increase
monitoring and hence gain more and new types of data. Therefore having the
tasks θ intermediate the positions W from the observed data Y is desirable
for both model structural reasons and practical data abstraction purposes. We
denote the observable data as a d-dimensional vector process in discrete time
Yt = (Yi,t)
d
i=1. In general we assume Yt ∈ Rd. In this example, however, several
of the components are count data, such as the number of times such events are
observed in a given period, so that: Yi,t ∈ Z+. We set here:
Y1: radical website visits Y2: physical meetings with known radicals
Y3: electronic meetings with known radicals Y4: meetings with trained radicals
Y5: meetings with known cell members Y6: seen at radical demonstrations
Y7: contacts with non-radicals Y8: public threats made
Y9: personal threats made Y10: increase in known financial resources
Y11: decrease in known financial resources Y12: obtaining large vehicle driving licence
Y13: vehicle dealer or rental website visits Y14: vehicle dealer or rental physical visits
Y15: E-visits to target locations Y16: physical visits to target locations
Y17: statements of intent Y18: legacy statements
As described in Section 3 we assume that for each task θj we can construct
a filter Zj of the relevant data: Here we define the function τ :
τ : Rd 7→ RR, Zj,t = τj(Yt)
τj(Yt) =
1
|Iθj |
∑
i∈Iθj
y˜i,t
where y˜i is a normalisation of Yi and |Iθj | is the cardinality of the index set of
components of Y dependent on the jth task. We could also set additional compo-
nents of Y to be changes over time of other components of Y and thus monitor
drops or spikes in, for example, communication levels with known radicalisers,
or with family and friends. We specify the relationship between the observable
data and the tasks in Table 2 where the (Yi, θj) entry indicates whether the ith
variable is relevant data for the jth task.
5.4 Specifications of the distributions of the task set given
position and task set likelihood
For each position we set the probability that all the tasks in that position’s
task set are being done to 0.4. The individual probabilities that each task is
being done given the suspect is in the neutral state are specified in the column
labelled “Neutral” in Table 3. The log odds interpolation methodology detailed
in Appendix A is then used to construct the probabilities that no tasks or less
than all the tasks were being done. For example, as shown in the Table 3,
for the Mobilised position, the tasks “Engaging in public threats”, “Making
personal threats”, “Reconnaissance of target locations”, and “Moving to target
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Observable θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
RadWebVisits 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PhysicalMeetsWithRadicals 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
E-MeetsWithradicals 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
MeetTrainedRadicals 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
MeetCellMembers 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SeenAtRadicalDemonstrations 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
ContactsWithNonRadicals 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
PublicThreatsMade 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PersonalThreatMade 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IncreaseInFinances 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
DecreaseInFinances 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
ObtainLGVLicence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
CarDealerWebHits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
CarDealerPhysicalVisits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
E-VisitsToTargetLocations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
VisitsToTargetLocations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
LegacyStatements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
StatementOfIntent 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 2: Routine Observation versus Task dependency structure
location” are relevant. Table 4 has the resulting probabilities for each point of
θI∗wi
∈ {0, 1}|θI∗wi |. For simplicity we used shifted asymmetric logistic functions
to construct the task set likelihood functions p(ZI∗(wi)|θI∗(wi)): see Equations
(18). The shift parameters x0,j and the growth rate parameters k0,j , k1,j were
used to construct functions that were relatively unresponsive when Zj < x0,j
but sharply responsive when Zj ≥ x0,j . An illustration of the form of these
functions is provided in Figure 3 for the one and two-dimensional cases i.e.
when there are one or two tasks in the task set I∗(wi); this is purely for ease
of plotting: as shown in Table 3 four dimensional task sets were used in the
example scenarios.
p(ZI∗(wi)|θI∗(wi)) = |θI∗(wi)|−1
∑
j∈I∗(wi)
g(Zj |θj , x0,j , k0,j , k1,j)
g(x|θ, x0, k0, k1) = 1
1 + exp(−k0(x− x0)) χ{x<x0} +
1
1 + exp(−k1(x− x0)) χ{x≥x0}
(18)
5.5 Scenarios
We illustrate the propagation of probabilities through the model based on sce-
narios of simulated data. We use the same framework as above and manually
set the routinely observed data Yt through 24 weekly time steps to examine how
the currently parameterised model behaves under each scenario.
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ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised Neutral
State Task Index Sets
EngageWithRadicalisers 1 0 0 0 0.020
EngageInPublicThreats 0 0 1 1 0.001
MakePersonalThreats 0 0 1 1 0.001
RedPubEngInRad 1 1 0 0 0.600
RedCntctWthFmlyFrnds 1 0 0 0 0.300
ObtainResources 1 1 0 0 0.300
LearnToDrive 0 1 0 0 0.300
ObtainVehicle 0 1 1 0 0.200
ReconnoitreTargets 0 0 1 1 0.100
MoveToTarget 0 0 0 1 0.200
Cardinality 4 4 4 4
p+ 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
p0 0.001 0.011 0.00000002 0.00000002
ξ 1.051 2.076 0.332 0.331
Table 3: Task/position dependencies; probability of task given Neutral state; p+ is probability
of all tasks being done, p0 that of none being done; ξi is solved for to make the probabilities
sum to one for each position
ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised
State Task Index Sets
np 0 0.00108 0.01080 0.00000002 0.00000002
np 0001 0.00475 0.01341 0.00112 0.00112
np 0010 0.00475 0.01341 0.00112 0.00112
np 0011 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 0100 0.00475 0.01341 0.00112 0.00112
np 0101 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 0110 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 0111 0.11019 0.09277 0.12098 0.12098
np 1000 0.00475 0.01341 0.00112 0.00112
np 1001 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 1010 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 1011 0.11019 0.09277 0.12098 0.12098
np 1100 0.02319 0.02742 0.01860 0.01860
np 1101 0.11019 0.09277 0.12098 0.12098
np 1110 0.11019 0.09277 0.12098 0.12098
np 1111 0.40000 0.40000 0.40000 0.40000
ntp 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
Table 4: Probabilities of task sets given each position using method in Appendix A
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(a) Orange line shows
p(ZI∗(wi)|θI∗(wi) = 1); Blue line
shows p(ZI∗(wi)|θI∗(wi) = 0)
(b) Two dimensional. Each coloured sur-
face is for a different value of θI∗wi
∈
{0, 1}2; ZI∗wi
(c) θI∗wi
= (0, 0) (d) θI∗wi
= (1, 1)
Figure 3: Illustrative task likelihood functional forms for one and two dimensional task sets
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Scenario 5.1. In this scenario the suspect increases their web visits to target
locations from week 8 and their physical visits to target locations from the
week 21; they are in constant communication with known radicals and there is
an increase in their finances followed by a decrease in first few weeks, during
which time they are seen to be visiting car dealers electronically and physically.
They make public and personal threats and in the last weeks of the period the
threatening data increases with a legacy statement and a statement of intent.
Figures 4a, 5a, 5c show the increase in threat level resulting from this scenario.
Scenario 5.2. The suspect’s communications and possible training / preparing
type data linearly decreases from initial levels similar to scenario 5.1 to zero over
the 24 weeks. Moreover there are no threats made during the whole period.
Figures 4b, 5b, 5d show the decreasing threat level resulting from this scenario.
(a) Scenario 5.1: a suspect pursuing ac-
tivities consistent with preparing for an
attack
(b) Scenario 5.2: a suspect reducing ac-
tivities consistent with no evidence of
threat
Figure 4: Posterior state probabilities over time under scenario 5.1 and 5.2
5.6 Eventual Probability of Mobilisation
For any individual suspect or group of suspects the medium to long-term prob-
abilities of mobilisation is of key interest and can aid as a model diagnostic tool.
We can estimate this by using the semi-Markov transition matrix to evolve the
current probabilities. The RDCEG in this section has the neutral state as the
single absorbing state hence asymptotically the probability of this state will go
to one; However in the practical medium term we can examine the behaviour
of the active positions including the mobilised state. Under the configuration of
the priors and the edge probabilities as in Figure 2 and with the holding time
distribution ζi(t, t
′) set to a constant 0.01 for the set time period of t′ − t equal
to one week (as used in the examples above), the qualitative behaviour of the
RDCEG’s state probabilities can be seen in Figures 6a and 6b. Figures 6c and
6d show the long term behaviour under alternative specifications where the mo-
bilised position is another absorbing state: the suspect once having mobilised
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(a) Position Score over time based on
Scenario 5.1
(b) Position Score over time based on
Scenario 5.2
ActiveConvert 0.02
Training 0.0139
Preparing 0.3381
Mobilised 0.6252
(c) RDCEG with final posterior
probabilities based on Scenario 5.1
ActiveConvert 0.1087
Training 0.3041
Preparing 0.1203
Mobilised 0.0697
(d) RDCEG with final posterior
probabilities based on Scenario 5.2
Figure 5: Position Score and RDCEG for 5.1 and 5.2
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and executed the attack cannot transition to any of the other states including
the neutral state. The reasoning behind this latter configuration is an assump-
tion that once the individual has mobilised this entails an attack and the end
of this particular police case.
(a) Position probabilities over 10 thou-
sand periods based purely on semi-
Markov transition matrix
(b) Position probabilities over 2 mil-
lion periods based purely on semi-Markov
transition matrix
(c) Position probabilities with two ab-
sorbing states over one thousand peri-
ods based purely on semi-Markov tran-
sition matrix; holding time transition
rate: ζi(t, t
′) = 0.01; edge probabilities
ma,n=mt,n=mp,n=0.3
(d) Chart showing the two absorbing
states’ stationary probabilities varying by
directly setting the per-period probability
of transition from each transient active
state to neutral from 0.01 to 0.99
Figure 6: Figures for long-term probability of mobilisation
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6 Discussion
In this paper we have described a novel three level hierarchical model that
utilises at its deepest level an RDCEG modelling the state of a suspect within the
stages of a potential attack. We illustrated how such an analysis can synthesise
information concerning that suspect, through sets of tasks to produce snap shot
summaries of the likely position of this person and the current threat they might
present.
The work we present here is the first phase of a programme. Currently, work-
ing with various domain experts, we are in the process of constructing a suite
of RDCEG templates and their associated tasks [34]. These describe different
criminal processes associated with assaults or violence against the general pub-
lic, indexed by type of crime, that build on existing criminological models. This
type of technology has already been well developed for BNs within the context
of forensic science [1, 24] and has established frameworks of processes linking
activities with evidence. The structure we use here helps in this development
because only the top layer of the hierarchy usually needs regular refreshing: the
possible positions and associated tasks are fairly stable over time. We hope
that within this paper we have illustrated that, just as in forensic science, such
methods are both promising and feasible. Indeed the harmonisation of this class
of models to forensic analogues means that evidence applied within an investi-
gation can be coherently integrated into case reports associated with criminal
proceedings if the suspect does attempt to perpetrate a crime.
In the next phase of this programme, building on these models of individual sus-
pects, we are moving into modelling the stochastic developments of populations
of violent criminals. This issue is complicated by the fact that many suspects
are working in teams and often coordinated. This dependence structure there-
fore has to be carefully modelled for such models to be realistic. However this
more challenging domain is also a potentially very fertile one - where standard
estimation of hyperparameters associated with different units and the Bayesian
selection of the most promising models can begin to be applied. The challenge
is that series are frequently disrupted so the systematic estimation of their hy-
perparameters is hard and needs strong prior information to be effective.
Finally in this paper we have concentrated mainly on predicting using evidence
specific to a particular suspect. However models of at least two other types of
evidence are routinely gathered. The first models in real time the interactions
between groups of individuals: through hierarchical network modelling. The
second are models of movements of suspect, and groups of such in time and
space: models deriving from more standard spatio - temporal Bayesian hierar-
chical models. In other settings e.g. [22] we have been able to prove how a
Bayesian integrating decision support system (IDSS) can be built to harmonise
and draw evidential strength by coherently combining these sources. Current
work is now focusing on developing such integrated systems for policing violent
crimes.
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Appendices
A Task probabilities given position
Some settings that keep elicitation of task probabilities to the minimum whilst
appearing to provide good discriminatory power in most circumstances are given
below. For each state wi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m, let
p
I∗(wi)
t,i , P
{
θI∗+(wi) = 1,θI∗−(wi) = 0|wi,Ft
}
be the probability that all the positive tasks and none of the negative tasks are
being done given the position is wi. For definitions of I
∗(wi), I∗+(wi), I
∗
−(wi) see
Equations 1 in Section 3. We define and elicit tasks in such a way that
p
I∗(wi)
t,i ≥ 0.2
i.e. given someone is in active position wi then the probability that ω in wi
is engaged in all the tasks that are positive indicators and none of the tasks
that are negative indicators is non-negligible. We also assume that the less the
engagement in the positive tasks the smaller the probability ω lies in this active
state and the contrary for the negative tasks.
Let r−i and r
+
i denote the cardinality of the sets I
∗
−(wi) and I
∗
+(wi). Sup-
pose ∅ ⊆ A ⊆ I∗+(wi) where 0 ≤ r(A) ≤ r+i is the cardinality of A and
∅ ⊆ B ⊆ I∗−(wi) where 0 ≤ r(B) ≤ r−i is the cardinality of B. Then
0 ≤ K(A,B) , r(A) + r−i − r(B) ≤ r+i + r−i (19)
so K is the number of tasks being done in I∗+(wi) plus those not being done in
I∗−(wi). Let the log odds be:
φ
I∗(wi)
t,i , log p
I∗(wi)
t,i − log
{
1− pI∗(wi)t,i
}
(20)
Then under the Naive Bayes assumption of Section 4 for w0, we set
φ
I∗(wi)
t,0 =
∑
k∈I∗(wi)
φkt,0 (21)
Then the full set of probabilities for any such A and B can be generated by
interpolating:
φi,A,Bt = αK(A,B),iφ
I∗(wi)
t,i + (1− αK(A,B),i)φI
∗(wi)
t,0
αK(A,B),i =
(
K(A,B)
r+i + r
−
i
)ξi
where ξi > 0 is constrained such that the resulting probabilities sum to one. This
setting has the property that preserves the sorts of monotonicity we require for
the comment above.
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B The semi-Markov transition matrix and re-
sulting recurrence equations
We now explicitly model the process Wt as a continuous time process, still with
discrete state space. We still assume that we observe data at discrete sequen-
tial times: (ti), i ∈ N but we model explicitly that the suspect may transition
between states between or at these observation times. Thus the discrete time
process Wtn is embedded in a continuous time semi-Markov process Wt, t ∈ R+.
Assume that the time interval is short so that at most one transition has oc-
curred between t and t′. Conditioning on the event that there has only been one
transition, let ζi (t, t
′) represent the probability of a transition from wi during
the time interval (t, t′], where ζi is the holding distribution for the ith position.
Let M0ij represent the probability that the suspect will transition to the position
wj from position wi given there has been exactly one state transition. Then the
components of the transition matrix are given by:
Mij(t, t
′,M0i,j , ζi) =
{
1− ζi (t, t′) , i = j
ζi (t, t
′)M0ij , i 6= j
Using the RDCEG of the vehicle attacker in Section 5, we have M0 and M(t, t′)
as in Table 5 with mi,j denoting edge probabilities: i.e. the probability of
transition from the source vertex wi to the destination vertex wj conditional on
a transition having occurred.
M0 Neutral ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised
N 0 0 0 0 0
A ma,n 0 ma,t ma,p 0
T mt,n 0 0 mt,p 0
P mp,n 0 0 0 mp,m
M mm,n 0 0 mm,p 0
M(t, t′) Neutral ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised
N 1 0 0 0 0
A ζa(t, t′)ma,n 1− ζa(t, t′) ζa(t, t′)ma,t ζa(t, t′)ma,p 0
T ζt(t, t′)mt,n 0 1− ζt(t, t′) ζt(t, t′)mt,p 0
P ζp(t, t′)mp,n 0 0 1− ζp(t, t′) ζp(t, t′)mp,m
M ζm(t, t′)mm,n 0 0 ζm(t, t′)mm,p 1− ζm(t, t′)
Table 5: Semi-Markov Transition Matrix
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Under the assumption that the observation times are frequent enough that at
most one transition could occur between them, the filtering equations to update
the position probabilities given the change in time and the observed data are
p(wi,tn+1 |Ztn+1) ∝ p(wi, tn+1|Ztn)× (22)∑
θI∗(wi)∈{0,1}|I
∗(wi)|
p(θI∗(wi)|wi)p(ZI∗(wi),tn+1 |θI∗(wi)) (23)
p(wi,tn+1 |Ztn) =
d∑
j=0
p(wj,tn |Ztn)Mj,i(tn, tn+1,M0, ζ) (24)
Equation (23) updates the position probabilities given the observed data at time
tn+1 whilst Equation (24) transitions the position probabilities over a small time
interval (tn, tn+1) according to the transition matrix M(tn, tn+1,M
0, ζ). Now
we ease the assumption that observation times are frequent enough that we can
exclude the possibility of more than one state transition between them. For
ease of exposition and notation we assume that the intervals between observa-
tion times are a multiple of |t− t′|, ie
tn+1 − tn = k|t′ − t|
for every tn and for some k ∈ N. Here we take the holding time distributions
ζi(t, t
′) as time-homogenous although in future work we plan to use inhomoge-
nous distributions. With homogeneity the transition matrix between observa-
tion times is then simply the appropriate power of M(t, t′), i.e.
M(tn, tn+1,M
0, ζ) = Mk(t, t′,M0, ζ)
Then Equation (24) can be written as:
p(wi,tn+1 |Ztn) =
d∑
j=0
p(wj,tn |Ztn)(Mk(t, t′,M0, ζ))i,j (25)
The prior and posterior log odds formulae used in Equation 10 are amended to
be based on Z rather than Y and to function as filtering recurrence equations
based on Zt. Suppressing Ft to simplify the notation we obtain:
ρit , log
(
p
(
wi|ZI∗(wi)tn
)
p (w0|Ztn)
)
, ρ∗it , log
(
p
(
wi|ZI∗(wi)tn+1
)
p
(
w0|Ztn+1
) )
The the loglikelihood ratio of Ztn+1 becomes
λi
(
ZI∗(wi)tn+1
)
, log
(∑
θI∗(wi)
p(ZI∗(wi)tn+1 |θI∗(wi))p(θI∗(wi)|wi)∑
θI∗(wi)
p(ZI∗(wi)tn+1 |θI∗(wi))p(θI∗(wi)|w0)
)
and the update formula on the log odds is
ρ∗it = ρit + λi
(
ZI∗(wi)t
)
(26)
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